

Message Text

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INFO CINCEUR

CINCLANT

CINCPAC

CINCUSAREUR

CINCUSNAVEUR

DIA WASHDC

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

USMISSION NATO

USLO PEKING

USNMR SHAPE

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 19177

LIMDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PARM, NATO, UR, US

SUBJ: MIL'SHTEYN ON STRATEGIC ISSUES

CINCEUR, CINCLANT, CINCPAC, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSNAVEUR
AND SHAPE FOR POLAD

REF: A. MOSCOW 18264

B. MOSCOW 16972

1. SUMMARY: MIL'SHTEYN, CHIEF OF STRATEGIC STUDIES DEPART-
MENT OF USA INSTITUTE, AND HIS DEPUTY L.S. SEMEJKO, TOLD US
DECEMBER 27 THAT SOVIET OBJECTIONS TO THE SCHLESINGER DOCTRINE
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REMAIN UNAFFECTED BY THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD (SEE REFTTEL A FOR

OPPOSING VIEW BY ANOTHER INSTITUTE OFFICIAL). THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUE TO FEEL THAT THE DOCTRINE'S STRESS ON ACCURACY AND THE DANGER OF ESCALATION IT ENTAILS ARE CAUSES FOR CONCERN. SEMEJKO SUGGESTED THAT A LIMIT ON NUMBER OF TESTS FOR NEW SYSTEMS BE CONSIDERED FOR AGREEMENT TO CURB THE ACCURACY RACE. MIL'SHTEYN STATED THAT AS A MATTER OF POLICY ALL SOVIET MISSILES ARE TARGETED AGAINST MILITARY TARGETS. MIL'SHTEYN ALSO REVEALED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN, AND EXPERTISE ON, CHINESE STRATEGIC AFFAIRS. HE DESCRIBED SOVIET DILEMMA IN ENSURING DETERRENCE AGAINST CHINA, BECAUSE OF ITS LOW STAGE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND MASSIVE POPULATION. IN DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MILITARY VIEW OF DETENTE, MIL'SHTEYN EXPLAINED APPARENT HARDER LINE IN MILITARY PUBLICATIONS AS BEING NECESSARY TO ENSURE ACCEPTABLE MILITARY READINESS. END SUMMARY.

2. SCHLESINGER DOCTRINE: DURING COURTESY CALL BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR AND EMBASSY OFFICER DEALING WITH POL/MIL AFFAIRS, MIL'SHTEYN AND SEMEJKO, UNLIKE TROFIMENKO OF THE SAME INSTITUTE (SEE REFTEL A), ASSERTED THAT THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT HAS NO BEARING ON SOVIET OBJECTIONS TO THE SCHLESINGER TARGETING DOCTRINE. THE DOCTRINE IS UNACCEPTABLE, THEY SAID, BECAUSE IN GIVING A NATIONAL LEADER THE CHOICE OF VARIOUS MODES OF NUCLEAR ATTACK, IT THEREBY MAKES NUCLEAR WAR A POSSIBLE OPTION. FURTHERMORE, THE STRESS IN THE DOCTRINE ON THE IMPORTANCE OF ACCURACY IMPLIES AN ATTEMPT TO ACQUIRE CAPABILITY FOR A FIRST STRIKE. WHY ELSE IS SUCH ACCURACY NEEDED IF NOT FOR STRIKES AT SILOS? BOTH MIL'SHTEYN AND SEMEJKO FELT THAT THE RACE FOR ACCURACY SHOULD SOMEHOW BE CONTROLLED. WHEN ASKED FOR SUGGESTIONS ON HOW THIS COULD BE DONE, SEMEJKO VOLUNTEERED AS A PERSONAL SUGGESTION THE POSSIBILITY OF LIMITING THE NUMBER OF TESTS OF NEW SYSTEMS, "PERHAPS TO TEN OR FIFTEEN." WHEN ASKED FOR MORE DETAILS ON PROPOSAL, SEMEJKO DEMURRED, SAYING THAT DETAILS WOULD HAVE TO BE DEVELOPED. MIL'SHTEYN POINTED OUT PRESENT U.S. ADVANTAGE IN ACCURACY AND SAID THAT FUTURE ADVANCES IN ACCURACY SHOULD BE LIMITED. BOTH SOVIETS MAINTAINED, AS THEY HAD WRITTEN IN THEIR ARTICLE ON THE SUBJECT (REF B), THAT ONCE THE THRESHOLD FROM CONVENTIONAL WAR TO NUCLEAR WAR IS CROSSED, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SIDE BEING ATTACKED TO DETERMINE, WITHIN THE TIME AT ITS DISPOSAL, WHETHER THE

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ATTACK IS ONLY LIMITED OR WHETHER IT IS FULL-SCALE.

3. MIL'SHTEYN AND SEMEJKO STILL PROFESS TO FEAR THE POTENTIAL OF A FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY WHICH THEY SEE IN THE DOCTRINE. MIL'SHTEYN SAID HE COULD REST COMFORTABLY WITH SUCH A DOCTRINE ONLY IF BOTH SIDES AGREED TO "RULES OF THE GAME" WHICH HE IMPLIED WOULD PROVIDE FOR A STEP-BY-STEP ESCALATION TO FULL WAR; HE QUICKLY ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE

UNLIKELY TO AGREE TO SUCH "RULES." SEMEJKO ALSO AGAIN ASSERTED THAT THE DOCTRINE VIOLATES THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR AGREEMENT THROUGH ADVOCATING LIMITED USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

4. MIL'SHTEYN DENIED POSSIBILITY THAT SOVIETS WOULD EVER MAKE A NUCLEAR FIRST STRIKE AND SAID THAT AS A MATTER OF POLICY ALL SOVIET MISSILES ARE TARGETED ON MILITARY TARGETS. SEMEJKO SECONDED THIS, ADDING THAT THE TERM "MILITARY TARGETS" WAS NOT DEFINED IN A NARROW SENSE FOR SUCH TARGETING, HOWEVER.

5. WHEN ASKED HOW HE SEES THE CHINESE FACTOR IN SVOEIT STRATEGIC PLANNING, MIL'SHTEYN SAID THAT "WE ARE OF COURSE NOW HAVING TO BEING TO STUDY THIS." SEMEJKO AT A NUMBER OF POINTS IN THE CONVERSATION STRESSED THE FACT THAT THE CHINESE THREAT MUST BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN ANY SOVIET DISCUSSION OF ARMS REDUCTION AND MIL'SHTEYN ALLUDED TO THE DILEMMA FACED BY THE SOVIET UNION IN THIS REGARD: MCNAMARA'S DOCTRINE OF "ASSURED DESTRUCTION" WAS EFFECTIVE WHEN LOSS TO AN ATTACKING SIDE WOULD INCLUDE AT LEAST 25 PER CENT OF ITS POPULATION AND 50-50 PER CENT OF ITS INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX. BUT DID SUCH PARAMETERS APPLY TO CHINA? WOULD THE PROSPECT OF A LOSS OF THIS MAGNITUDE EFFECTIVELY DETER CHINA FROM ATTACKING? MIL'SHTEYN ANSWERED HIS OWN QUESTION, HALF-JOKINGLY, BY SAYING THAT THE PROSPECT OF A LOSS OF 25 PERCENT OF ITS POPULATION WOULD BE AN INCENTIVE TO CHINA, NOT A DETERRENT. MIL'SHTEYN ALSO SEEMED QUITE WILL INFORMED ON PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN CHINESE MISSILE PRODUCTION, AND KNEW THE BACKGROUND OF THE CHINESE SCIENTIST CHIEN HSUEH-SEN, FORMERLY WITH THE ROCKET PROPULSION LABORATORY AT CAL TECH, WHO LEFT THE U.S. IN THE 1950'S TO TAKE CHARGE OF CHINESE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT.

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ACTION EUR-08

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5796

INFO CINCEUR

CINCLANT
CINCPAC
CINCUSAREUR
CINCUSNAVEUR
DIA WASHDC
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
USMISSION NATO
USLO PEKING
USNMR SHAPE
USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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6. IN A DISCUSSION ON THE SOVIET MILITARY VIEW OF DETENTE, MIL'SHTEYN -- A RETIRED LIEUTENANT GENERAL -- TOOK THE POSITION THAT THE HARDER LINE ON PROBLEMS OF WESTERN SOCIETY TAKEN IN KRASNAYA ZVEZDA AND OTHER SOVIET MILITARY PUBLICATIONS IS WHAT ONE WOULD NATURALLY EXPECT THERE. ONE COULD NOT PREACH UNINTERRUPTED PEACE AND HARMONY AND EXPECT MILITARY VIGILANCE TO REMAIN AT ACCEPTABLE LEVELS, HE SAID. THE SOVIET MILITARY HAS NEVER SPOKEN OUT AGAINST ANY AGREEMENT REACHED BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, HE SAID, AND IT HAS KEPT ITS PERSONNEL AWARE OF THE PROCESS OF DETENTE. IN A DISCUSSION OF A BOOK REVIEW BY CHIEF OF STAFF KULIKOV (PRAVDA NOVEMBER 13) WHICH STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MILITARY FOLLOWING THE POLICY SET OUT BY THE PARTY, MIL'SHTEYN SAID THAT NO ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO READ BETWEEN CONFIDENTIAL

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THE LINES OF THE ARTICLE ANY POLICY DIFFERENCES ON THE PART OF THE MILITARY. "IF KULIKOV HADN'T SAID THAT, WE WOULD GET A NEW CHIEF OF STAFF WHO WOULD," HE SAID. HE ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT THE ARTICLE WAS PUBLISHED IN PRAVDA RATHER THAN IN KRASNAYA ZVEZDA BECAUSE OF THE PROMINENCE OF SHAPOSHNIKOV, WHOSE MEMOIRS KULIKOV WAS REVIEWING.

7. AN EFFORT TO ENGAGE OUR SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS IN A DISCUSSION OF CIVIL DEFENSE PRODUCED LITTLE THAT WAS NOTEWORTHY. SEMEJKO ATTRIBUTED TO A U.S. PUBLICATION THE COMMENT THAT THE MORE EXTENSIVE SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE SYSTEM GIVES IT ONLY A FIVE PER CENT ADVANTAGE OVER THE UNITED STATES IN CASE OF A FULL-SCALE WAR. MIL'SHTEYN CLAIMED THAT HE KNOWS LITTLE ABOUT THE SUBJECT SINCE HE WAS A MILITARY MAN AND THE MILITARY IN THE USSR DID NOT HANDLE CIVIL DEFENSE. HE COMMENTED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS IMPRESSION IS THAT MUCH OF THE PUBLIC CAMPAIGN ON CIVIL DEFENSE WHICH APPEARS IN THE PRESS IS NOTHING MORE THAN RHETORIC WITH LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE IN THE WAY OF TRAINING BEHIND IT.

8. MIL'SHTEYN SERVED FOR A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME -- AND UNTIL HIS RETIREMENT THREE YEARS AGO -- AS THE DEAN OF FACULTY FOR THE SOVIET MILITARY ACADEMY OF THE GENERAL STAFF. HIS MILITARY CAREER AS A GENERAL WAS SPENT ENTIRELY IN STAFF WORK, WITH NO COMMAND EXPERIENCE. DURING WWII HE SERVED UNDER ZHUKOV. HE NOTED THAT HE PLAYS TENNIS AT THE TSSKA SPORTS CLUB ON LENINGRADSKOE SHOSSE, " WHERE OUR MINISTER" (GRECHKO) PLAYS, SO HE APPARENTLY STILL MOVES IN HIGH MILITARY CIRCLES.

9. COMMENT: WE CANNOT RECALL HAVING SEEN IN SO MANY WORDS A DIRECT STATEMENT THAT ALL SOVIET MISSILES ARE TARGETED AGAINST MILITARY OBJECTS, AS CLAIMED BY MIL'SHTEYN. IF PUSHED TO THE WALL TO MAKE A STATEMENT ON HOW SOVIET MISSILES ARE TARGETED, HOWEVER, HIS IS PROBABLY THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS STANCE THEY WOULD TAKE. MIL'SHTEYN'S STATEMENT MAY THEREFORE BE SELF-SERVING AND OF LIMITED VALUE, AS HIS COMMENTS ON CIVIL DEFENSE ALMOST CERTAINLY WERE. BUT HIS COMMENTS ON THE CHINESE FACTOR WERE REVEALING. ASIDE FROM EVALUATIONS OF ANY ACTUAL CHINESE THREAT, THE SOVIETS OBVIOUSLY FACE A CONSIDERABLE PROBLEM FROM THE STANDPOINT OF STRATEGIC DOCTRINE, I.E., HOW DOES ONE TARGET AGAINST A NATION OF 800 MILLION PEOPLE WITH COMPARATIVELY LITTLE CENTRALIZED INDUSTRY IN SUCH A WAY THAT DETERRENCE IS CONFIDENTIAL

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